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Abstract 
 
This paper is aimed to analyze the rise of New Mexican emerging multinational enterprises 
(MexEMNEs) into the global market. There is a growing interest in the study of these 
emerging multinationals among scholars. Several theoretical perspectives are reviewed 
which can give an explanation of the emergence of Mexican multinationals and support 
their expansion in overseas markets. It is intended to set up scenarios for future 
development. Finally, it is concluded that the survivor Mexican firms of this process of 
“creative destruction” have transformed into capable and innovative MNEs in order to look 
and move ahead and take advantage of the challenging new opportunities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The term multinational has meant the expansion of American firms around the globe. 
During the 1970s and 1980s “Third World multinationals” were identified and 
characterized by a number of authors. However, their foundations have changed over time 
under the competitive advantage strategy of the global economy era. Profound economic 
changes in emerging economies during the 1990s resulted in a more competitive 
environment that forced large firms to develop new strategies, build new capabilities and 
move into more global competitive markets. Newer emerging multinationals enterprises 
(MNEs) from emerging economies are in the process of transforming the global foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  
 
The emergence of rapidly developing economies is characterized by a wave of 
economic growth and the rise of local enterprises to become “global challengers” (BCG, 
2009) that are globalizing their business and challenging the traditional American model of 
modern multinational enterprise (MNE). The emergence of this “global challengers” is a 
trend, although this new emerging multinationals are hardly world leaders in their industry 
or market niches. 
 
Mexico had been host economy for multinationals from developed countries. 
Foreign policy entered México when this country changed trade policy from an economic 
model of import substitution to an export oriented strategy model. Trade liberalization 
policy has changed the behavior of large Mexican firms providing incentives to 
internationalize their activities. The Mexican emerging multinational enterprises 
(MexEMNEs) are involved in broader processes of economic globalization of Mexico post-
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). After 15 years of the implementation of 
NAFTA, Mexico has become the 12
th
 largest economy of the world and one of the leading 
world exporters in manufacturing goods.  
 
In the late 1990s, large Mexican firms that survived market reform and structural 
adjustment policies started to invest overseas.  Since then, new multinationals are rising in 
Mexico as well as other emerging economies are changing the corporate world. The 
analysis of Suarez and Oliva (2002) shows that emerging multinationals are successful 
survivors from the complex competitive environments of structural economic reforms in 
the stages of turnaround and catch-up, expansion, acquisition of new capabilities and quest 
for industry leadership.  
 
Although this New Mexican emerging multinational enterprises (MexEMNs) share 
common structural features with emerging multinationals from other countries, they have 
the imprinting of specific national experiences. Mexican new multinationals have irrupted 
on a global scale multiplying investments beyond the borders to lead their business sectors. 
Mexican emerging multinational enterprises (MexEMNs) rank among the most global and 
largest firms.  
 
 
2. Theoretical perspectives  
 
Various social sciences have contributed to study multinational enterprises in emerging 
economies. Conventional theories of economics and modern theories of multinational 
enterprises have not predicted the emergence of large new multinationals from emerging 
economies (Wells, 2007).  
 
The multinationals enterprises (MNEs) originating from emerging economies have 
been referred as “Third-world multinationals by Wells (1983), “latecomer firms” by 
Mathews (2002), “unconventional multinationals” by Li (2003), “Challengers” by BCG 
(2008), “emerging multinationals” by Accenture (2008), “new multinationals” by Guillén 
and García-Canal (2009) and “emerging market multinational enterprises” (EM MNEs) by 
Luo and Rui (2009). However, the semantic of these terms are confusing the debate 
although may be other that may describe better the phenomena. 
 
Emerging market multinational enterprises have been researched from several 
theoretical approaches: 
 
- The evolutionary process perspective is a behavioral approach that focuses on roots, 
causes and features of a gradual internationalization of firms. The Uppsala model 
considers that organizations develop incrementally learning processes which affect 
the investment decision making behavior. This model connects psychic distance 
with of density of ethnic ties which result in cultural and institutional proximity 
between two countries which provide market opportunities to cater demand of 
Mexican products (Vasquez-Parraga and Felix, 2004).  
 
In this sense, Mexican emerging multinationals enterprises (MexMNEs) have a 
strong presence not only in Latin American, Ibero American markets, including 
Spain, but also in Hispanic markets in United States and wherever there are 
Mexican migrants or population with Mexican background. However, it must be 
recognized that determinism is one limitation of the Uppsala model. 
 
- The springboard approach sustains that global expansion of MNEs is a response to 
their moves on global markets (Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002). 
 
- Government steward logic approach postulates that MNEs receive political mandate 
to invest abroad to acquire the needed scarce natural resources (Deng, 2004; World 
Investment Report (WIR), 2006). This political mandate may be more logical for 
state-owned enterprises. State ownership enterprises have enjoyed a protected 
domestic market and have received political commitment to invest overseas and 
have turned into the new emerging multinationals.  
 
- New emerging multinational enterprises as a large monopolistic firms tend to 
diversify functions and locations to have more access to scarce resources following 
a strategy of international exploitation. Large firms tend to undertake international 
expansion expecting that diversification can avoid the costs of inefficient capital 
markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Also these emerging multinational enterprises 
may follow a strategy of exploration to capitalize on existing or creating and 
developing resources and technological capabilities, which leads to invest more in 
home-countries (Goldenstein, 2007, Hoskisson, et al., 2000). 
 
- Strategic management theory focusing on performance differences of emerging 
multinationals considers their competitive advantages in a global context in order to 
develop new capabilities and strategies. Bartlet and Ghoshal (2000) concluded that 
emerging multinationals overcame the same core challenges to compete in a global 
market by adopting strategies to become the late mover as a source of competitive 
advantage and developing a cross-border learning culture. Strategic intent approach 
considers that outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) by MNEs are aimed 
toward the acquisition of strategic assets (Child and Rodriguez, 2005; Rui and Yip, 
2008).  
 
- One characteristic of trade’s oriented foreign direct investment is that “it is an 
investing country´s comparatively disadvantaged industry that invests overseas, to 
achieve a stronger comparative advantage trough providing appropriate capital 
goods and technology…to its production subsidiary in the foreign country” 
(Goldstein, 2007: 75). In fact, foreign direct investment is one mean of emerging 
multinationals to increase market power perpetuating the monopolistic role of 
multinationals in foreign markets. 
 
- Institutional escapism argue that MNEs try to avoid les developed institutional 
arrangements and environments by going global (Cuervo-Cazurra and Gengc, 2008; 
Witt and Lewin, 2007; Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008). Firms may have 
different institutional arrangements and environments, however those firms that 
have domestic constrained institutional environments may be more willing to search 
for better opportunities abroad. 
 
- The ambidexterity perspective argues that MNEs are ambidextrous organizations 
“pursuing simultaneous fulfillment of two disparate, and sometimes seemingly 
conflicting objectives” (Luo and Rui, 2009: 50). This perspective suggests that 
MNEs have four dimensions of ambidexterity: Co-orientation, co-competence, co-
opetition and co-evolution. 
 
- Resource-based view and dynamic capabilities approach sustains that the expansion 
of emerging multinationals is the result of the growth of the firm. According to the 
theory of firm-level growth (Penrose, 1955), management of emerging 
multinationals coordinate bundles of resources without any limits to achieve scope 
economies. Multinationals arise as efficient instruments to transfer knowledge 
across borders (Kogut and Zander, 2003). Firms posses’ different capabilities. 
  
- The eclectic or OLI paradigm based on transaction cost economics emphasizes 
categories of ownership or firm specific advantages and core competences, 
localization or country specific advantages and internalization or structural 
governance advantages. The eclectic paradigm conceptualizes decisions to invest 
abroad in terms of market, product and industry characteristics (Godstein, 2007: 
74). Outward foreign direct investment is driven by “differences in rates of return 
and capital abundance” (Goldstein, 2007: 74).  
 
 
 
3. Expansion of New Mexican emerging multinationals enterprises 
 
The “new” multinationals from the emerging economies have followed different 
pattern of global expansion. New multinationals from emerging economies invested 
overseas in wholly owned subsidiaries, joint ventures or branches (Wells, 1983). In order to 
invest abroad, emerging multinationals must have some firm-specific advantages over 
competitors such as low-cost, economies of scale, product differentiation, technological 
know-how and others. However, a recent trend of Latin American multinationals is 
described by Goldstein (2007:7) stating that they “have lost leadership that was theirs for 
most of the 20
th
 Century”.  
 
The entry to global markets, expansion and proliferation of the “new” multinational 
enterprises (MNs) originating in emerging economies, such as the case of Brazil, China, 
India and México, during the last two decades, have surprised policymakers and analysts. 
The Boston Consulting Group (2006) identified 6 Mexican MNEs out of top 100 emerging 
multinationals. The 2009 Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 100 new global challengers are 
based on 14 rapidly development economies (RDEs), including Mexico.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Characterization of New Mexican multinational enterprises (MexMNEs) 
 
New Mexican emerging multinationals (MexMNEs) operates within a range of economic 
sectors although they are more concentrated in construction, telecommunications, food and 
beverages and some others. Large economic groups and foreign multinationals control 
industries in México and there are evidences that these groups will remain playing an 
important role, although there is evidence also that the stock market is growing slowly. 
According to the analysis of Grosse (2007b), Mexican large economic groups are 100 
percent family control, although the structure of most emerging Mexican MNEs is one of 
the open societies publicly listed and no longer directly or indirectly controlled by the state. 
 
The industrial sector has changed in México during the last 30 years in Mexico. A 
close analysis to changes in the structure of industry from 1970 to 1992, measured by the 
structural change index, shows that engineering intensive industries has grown from 12.0 to 
15.6 during this period and automobiles from 8.4 to 18.6, while natural resource intensive 
industries and resources processing industries has dropped from 43.2 down to 40.8 and 
labor intensive industries from 36.4 to 25 (Katz, 2007). The automobile industry in Mexico 
has expanded strongly.  
 
According to the KOF (2010) Index of Globalization, Mexico is neither one of the 
World’s 15 most globalized countries nor one of the World’s least globalized countries. 
Despite the structural reform and major economic liberalization efforts introduced in the 
last three decades, Mexico is consistently lagging behind in the globalization process. 2010 
KOF Index of Globalization ranks Mexico in 71, and 81 in economic globalization, among 
208 countries based on data from the year 2007.  
 
However, Mexican new MNES are taking advantage of global reach and scale 
resulting from economic globalization processes, technological changes and increasing 
market competitiveness, by strategizing to succeed in a complex and uncertain international 
environment. The Mexican emerging MNEs are taking up the strategy of globalization 
further beyond the export phase of economic development. Mexican New MNEs are taking 
advantage of free trade agreements to search for partners to make strategic alliances with 
international businesses to get into foreign markets. Table 1 shows destinations of Mexican 
foreign direct investment in Latin America in 2005.  
 
“New” Mexican emerging multinational enterprises (MexEMNs) have been 
investing in greenfield and acquiring local companies in American, African, Asian and 
European markets. Before the 2000s the overseas investments by Mexican companies was 
very limited and practically nonexistent. Since 2000, Mexican firms have conducted a 
massive global expansion based on outbound mergers and acquisitions mostly through 
Latin-American, which have given the New Mexican emerging multinationals (MexEMNs) 
several positions in the global market. 
 
Table 1. Country’s destination of Mexican foreign direct investment by cumulative 
inflows 
Destination countries Cumulative FDI inflows 
Argentina 4 
Costa Rica 8 
  
Source: Based on estimations of Goldstein (2007)  
 
Since 2000, there is a pattern of increasing outward foreign direct investment of 
Mexican MNEs. In 2004, the Mexican direct investment abroad was 17. 5 billion dollars 
and the tendency are to increase as Mexican companies are becoming more competitive 
(Banco de México, 2006). In 2005 reached $6.2 billion. More details are provided in table 
2. 
 
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has identified several patterns that are being 
followed by the emerging Mexican MNEs in their strategies of internationalization and 
globalization processes of operations: To become global brands, to turn technological 
capabilities into global innovation, to acquire and monetize natural resources and 
commodities and to implement new business models to multiple markets, such as the case 
of CEMEX.  
 
Table2- Foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows and outward foreign direct 
investment stocks from Mexico (US$ m.) 
Year Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) outflows from 
Mexico (US$ m.) 
Outward foreign direct 
investment stocks from 
Mexico (US$ m.) 
1989      840 
1995  2, 572 
         1992-1998    549  
1999 1, 475  
2000    984  7, 540 
2001 4, 404 11, 944 
2002     930 12, 067 
2003 1, 784 13, 645 
2004 2, 240 15, 885 
2005 6, 200  
Sources: Based on estimations of Goldstein (2007) with UNCTAD data at 
www.worldinvestmentreport.com and Banco de México (2006) 
 
Mexican new MNEs are heterogeneous, from holdings of businesses such as Carso 
Grupo to single industry such as CEMEX (Cementos Mexicanos). The diverse patterns of 
transformation from domestic to global businesses have been already studied for the most 
successful cases: Telecommunications is linked to privatization, engineering services to 
professional development, financial and banking sector to privation and media and 
entertainment to government restrictions (López Villafane and Ruiz Durán, 2006).  
 
Mexican MNEs have developed a set of technological core competences that enable 
them to compete in the international markets. Mexican MNEs in construction, chemicals, 
telecommunications, etc., face lower hurdles to adopt technology, have developed 
technological capabilities and become competitive in the global market in medium and high 
technology manufacturing sectors. High technology business has been developing a 
“culture for transnational operations” (López Villafane and Ruiz Durán, 2006) such as the 
case of the software industry. In this sense, the emerging Mexican MNEs are seeking 
proactively the best talent available.  
 
The development of ethnic brands is considered a pattern of expansion (Guillén and 
García-Canal, 2009). Mexican MNEs invest in ethnic markets to cater the consumers that 
belong to Hispanic and more specifically the Mexican communities. However, although the 
ethnic, language and cultural heritage is considered an advantage, however had been 
reported by Mexican MNEs as one of the main barriers to enter foreign markets (Tavares, 
2007). As Mexican MNEs scramble to establish their foothold in overseas markets, the 
cultural limitations and impediments are more evident on operational and staffing practices. 
Therefore, Mexican MNEs abroad are challenged by local economic and cultural practice. 
 
 
5. Strategies implemented by Mexican emerging multinational enterprises 
 
The pragmatic neoliberal economic, fiscal and monetary policies implemented in 
México in the last 25 years have pervaded the corporate governance and managerial 
practices.  Also, the pragmatism of entrepreneurs has provided the moorings for corporate 
strategies of the emerging Mexican MNEs (Santiso, 2006; Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006). 
 
A pattern of expansion of Mexican MNEs is that one centered on firms producing 
goods based on in raw materials industries and the availability of natural resources, such as 
cement.  
 
Grosse and Thomas (2007) interviewed 15 Mexican firms in 2004-05 known to 
have pursued high levels of business diversification, and found as the key competitive 
advantages in large Mexican MNEs for overseas competition. Table 1 gives more details of 
sources of competitive advantages in large Mexican multinational enterprises. 
 
Table 3: Sources of competitive advantages in large Mexican MNEs 
Competitive 
advantage 
Description Examples Sources 
Low-cost production Based on small-scale 
manufacturing or 
low wages  
Gigante, FEMSA Grosse and Thomas  
2007; Wells, 1983; 
Peres, 1998. 
Superior product or 
service quality 
Better phone 
service, higher-
quality shows; 
superior parts 
Televisa, TV 
Azteca, DESC 
Grosse and Thomas  
2007. 
Ties to  existing 
clients  
Suppliers to MNEs DESC Grosse and Thomas  
2007; Wells, 1983. 
Ethnic connections  Televisa, Gigante Grosse and Thomas  
2007; Lall, 1984; 
Thomas & Grosse, 
2005. 
Technology  CEMEX Grosse and Thomas  
2007; Lall, 1984; 
Thomas & Grosse, 
2005. 
Membership in Ability to realize Multivision; Carso; Grosse and Thomas  
economic group economies of scope Salinas 2007; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000. 
Source: Based on Grosse and Thomas (2007) 
 
The forms analyzed by Grosse and Thomas (2007) developed sprawling distribution 
channels involving a massive pool of resources which contributed to the firms to expand 
abroad. 
 
The key advantages in overseas competition for Mexican firms is the low-cost 
production based on small-scale manufacturing or low wages (Wells, 1983; Thomas and 
Grosse, ; Peres, 1998) and offshore production for industrial-country clients (Wells, 1983), 
ties to existing clients such as suppliers to MNS and ethnic connections (Lall, 1984), 
technology (Lall, 1984; Grosse and Thomas, 2007 ). Grosse (2007a) found the strengths 
that enable MNEs to compete in domestic and foreign markets are high-quality products 
and services, low-cost production, control over distribution channels and good relationships 
with government and other institutions.  
 
Grosse (2007b) also report the key competitive strengths of Mexican economic 
groups, production of high quality products and /or services in  the industries of auto parts, 
publishing, construction, TV and telephone; production of low costs products in auto parts, 
beverages, books and retail stores; relationships with existing clients, in industries of auto 
parts and beverages; superior distribution network in airline, beverages, conglomerate, 
publishing, retail stores, telephone; superior service in airline, retail stores and telephone 
and diversification in TV and conglomerate.   
 
The strategies implemented by the New Mexican emerging MNEs range from 
restructuring, mergers and acquisitions to attraction of foreign investment, although 
vertically integrated business into multinationals in an open economies is becoming an 
obsolete strategy. Mexican emerging multinationals use mergers and acquisitions to expand 
their overseas projects of innovation and manufacturing bases to build global recognition, 
even if they lack competitive advantages such as portfolio of intellectual property rights, 
economies of scale, market power, etc. Since 2006 there is a large wave of huge 
acquisitions from Mexican emerging MNEs confirming that the strategy of grow through 
mergers and acquisitions is becoming stronger among them (See table 4 below). 
 
Table 4: Selected Mexican emerging multinational enterprises’ acquisitions in the 
OECD market 
Mexican multinational 
enterprise 
Target OECD company Description 
CEMEX RMC (UK) Completed the US$4.1 bn. 
Acquisition in February 
2005. 
Gruma Corporation Nuoba de Francheschi and 
Figli (Italy) 
The world’s largest tortilla 
producer bought 51% of the 
US$27 m. maize 
manufacturer in July 2004, 
with a view to integrate it 
with its UK factory. 
Gruma Corporation Ovis Bosque (Netherlands) Took over Europe’s biggest 
flour tortilla manufacturer. 
Sales Euros20m, in 2004. 
Kosa Hoechst Celanese’s 
polyester fiber plants 
(Germany) 
Bought when the German 
company decided to move to 
higher-value synthetics. 
KoSa a U.S.-Mexican 
venture managed by 
Mexicans, is now the 
world’s leading polyester 
maker.  
   
Source: Based on Goldstein (2007) 
 
In fact, the results of the survey conducted by United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2006) shows that risk 
diversification is one of the major benefits of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
more than to be a major motivation for internationalization (Tavares, 2007), although the 
largest Mexican MNE CEMEX was not considered by the survey. However, because 
Mexican MNEs are averse to risk investments overseas, they look for safer portfolio 
allocation of opportunities in the US market than in Chinese market for example. CEMEX 
has had risk management as a major motivation for internationalization of its operations.  
 
The analysis of fifteen competitive Mexican largest economic groups conducted by 
Grosse and Thomas (2007) found that their strategies focused on traditional competitive 
advantages in production and distribution efficiency and high-quality and lower-costs 
relative to home and foreign competitors, were more important than diversification. 
Regarding the effects of the “Tequila crisis” of 1994-95 on MNEs found difference 
between those having greater overseas diversification being more successful than the more 
domestically oriented firms. Risk diversification has been a major motivation for 
internationalization of Mexican multinationals. More diversified firms achieved better 
financial performance. Domestic capitals that survived economic crisis learned to compete 
in the global market.  
 
According to Grosse and Thomas (2007:255) “Overall, the large Mexican groups 
appear to be able to compete overseas not on the basis of technological superiority or 
economies of scale but due to their ability to build distribution channels in Latin America, 
to follow existing customers to other countries, and to sell high-quality products and 
services, often to the Hispanic market, in the United States or in Latin America”. This 
statement is truth for the geographical area of the Americas but what about the Mexican 
MNEs doing business in Europe, Asia, Africa and Oceania?  
 
 
6. Performance of Mexican emerging multinational enterprises’ competitiveness 
 
It is quite difficult to measure the performance and gauge the real impact of Mexican 
emerging multinationals. Lack of opportunities and incentives for large Mexican companies 
in the domestic market have pushed them going abroad to widen their business and benefit 
from global markets. Deregulation of the market in Mexico occurred since the last years of 
the 80s but the turning point was the entry to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in January 1
st
, 1994, which had an impact on the more-diversified Mexican 
firms.  
 
Between 1994 and 2000, the information technology (IT) manufacturing boomed, 
the electronics sector and the value of exports grew by 500 percent (Zarsky and Gallagher, 
2007). However, the flagship MNEs shut down most operations during the industry 
shakeout of 2001-03. The researchers found two factors as being the main cause of the 
failure: A shift in global strategy towards outsourcing, and the lack of an active policy to 
support foreign investments.  
 
According to the analysis of Grosse and Thomas (2007:262) the “more-international 
firms had superior performance than the more domestic group…”, which is leading to the 
conclusion that greater internationalization correlates with higher performance. 
 
Mexican MNEs have emerged as successful global companies in areas with 
intermediate levels of technological innovation, after overcame the internal conditions and 
difficulties of two financial crises. However, according to Grosse and Thomas (2007:257) 
the internationalization of Mexican companies “appears to be moderately positive in 
defusing the impact of the tequila crisis in México”. Mexican companies that were doing 
business abroad were more successful in surviving the tequila crisis because exports were 
more internationally competitive.   
 
There is a rising group of large Mexican companies that have been increasing global 
competitiveness pursued through diverse proactive business strategies to build up a position 
in the global market and becoming multinationals (Garrido, 2006), although the statistical 
analysis of Grosse and Thomas (2007:257) “give a limited amount of insight into the 
strategies of large Mexican groups in the turbulent 1990s”. A puzzling phenomenon is the 
fact that there were more Mexican emerging multinational enterprises (MexEMEs) in the 
first years of the 1990s, then diminished the last years and rose again in the early years of 
2000s.  
 
From 1999 to 2002, CEMEX was the only one Latin American nonfinancial MNEs 
ranked by foreign assets that made it to the UNCTAD’s list of the top 100. However, 
Goldstein (2007) has reported among the top 50 emerging multinationals ranked by 2003 
foreign assets, CEMEX in 5
th
 place, America Movil in 6
th
 and Bimbo in 47 while measured 
by 2002 foreign assets, Gruma in 40
th
 place, Savia 43th, Grupo Imsa 44
th
, and Cintra 49
th
. 
Among the top emerging multinationals Mexico had 3 listed in 1993, 7 in 2002 but only 3 
in 2003 (Goldstein, 2007 elaborated in UNCTAD data). Sklair and Robbins (2002) 
identified a downward trend in multinationals of three Latin American emerging 
economies, Argentina, Brazil and México, listed in Fortune top 500: Multinationals from 
these three countries represented 33 percent in 1965 and only 16 percent in 2001.   
 
In 2005, among the World´s 50 largest MNEs from emerging economies, ranked by 
foreign assets, CEMEX, an industry in construction materials was number 5, América 
Móvil in Telecommunications, was number 6. Grupo Bimbo, S.A. de C.V. in the food 
industry was 46 and Gruma in the industry of food and beverages was number 48 
(UNCTAD, 2005: 270-71). In the 2006 UNCTAD’s list of nonfinancial transnational 
corporations of developing countries ranked by foreign assets, the Mexican new MNEs 
listed are CEMEX, Telmex and America Movil and Grupo Bimbo. 
 
The top 2000 global enterprises recorded by Forbes (2005) lists about 20 Mexican 
multinationals. Also Fortune 500 (2006) lists 5 Mexican global companies out of 500 
global companies. Mexican new multinationals have multiplied mergers and acquisitions 
outside Mexico in the last ten years. The acquisitions in Latin America by Mexican 
companies from 2000-2006, excluding internal market was 10, 217 US$ million (BBV 
Corporate Finance, 2006) the highest of Latin American countries. Mexican emerging 
multinational enterprises (MexMNEs) are among the largest number of employees in 
United States. Goldstein (2007) analyses the impact on employment at emerging Mexican 
multinationals’ affiliates in selected OECD countries using different data bases for different 
years (See below table 5). 
 
Table 5. Employment at emerging Mexican multinationals’ affiliates in selected 
OECD countries 
Selected OECD Country Employment at emerging 
Mexican multinationals’ 
affiliates 
Database 
USA                                    49 100 Preliminary results for the 
2002 benchmark survey. 
Foreign direct investments 
in the United States: 
Operations of U.S. affiliates 
of foreign companies. 
Japan                                         215 Geishiskey Kigyo (2003). 
Year-end 2002 figures. 
Germany                                         400 Year-end 2003 figures. 
France 200 Source: Insee (Lifi survey) - 
Diane. Year-end 2002 
figures: Agriculture and 
finance excluded. 
Italy 3 Mariotti and Mutinelli 
(2005) 
Sweden 0 ITPS (2005) 
Netherlands 0 Statistics Netherlands 
Analysis of Inwar FATS 
Information (Business 
Register, 2005, and Data 
Collection, 2003, on 
Enterprise Group financial 
statistics. 
Austria 0 Figures for 2001, joint 
Oesterrichische 
Nationalbank and Statistics 
Austria pilot study of Inwar 
FATS. 
Total 47 918  
Source: Own design based on Goldstein (2007: 23) 
 
In 2005, Mexico is the second just after Brazil in outward foreign direct investment 
(Santiso, 2007).  Mexican companies included in the major 100 Latin American companies 
(América Economía, 2006) sold 46.7 as percentage of total sales were made in foreign 
markets, mostly in United States  
 
The main outward investors from Mexico are Grupo Mexico in mining, la Moderna-
Seminis in agribusiness, Techint (formely Hylsamex) in steel and other metals and metals 
products, Cemex in cement, Grupo Vitro in Glass, Grupo Maseca and Grupo Bimbo in 
Food Products, Femsa and Jugos del Valle in beverages, Dina and san Luis Rassini in Auto 
Parts and Vehicles, Mabe in domestic appliances and parts, electronics, America Movil in 
telecommunications, ICA in engineering and construction, Elektra in retail, Televisa in 
television, CIE in entertainment and Grupo Posadas in hotels. (Tavares, 2007). 
   
The 2009 BCG global challengers lists seven Mexican companies among them 
América Móvil, Cemex, Femsa, Gruma, Grupo Bimbo, Mexichem and Nemak. Mexichem 
is new to the 2009 BCG 100.  
 
 
7. Analytical description of the New Mexican emerging MNEs 
 
Alfa is a conglomerate operating in a wide range of industrial sectors although in the last 
years the strategy is aimed to strengthening only the most profitable business, and thus 
selling Hylsamex to Techint in 2005. Hylsamex has been the largest acquisition of Techint. 
This strategy favored the expansion of Nemak operations to supply its products to 
automobile plants in North America, South America, Europe, Australia and China. Other 
strategic business of Alfa is Sigma in the food sector and the petrochemical industry. Alfa 
has partnerships and strategic alliances with firms in Unites States, Europe, Japan and 
South America.   
 
CEMEX is a global competitor well knows world-wide MNN, the third largest cement 
company in the World, just after Lafarge (French) and Holcim (Swiss), and the largest of 
Latin America (UNCTAD, 2005). Among the top 50 multinationals based in emerging 
economies, measuring foreign assets CEMEX was ranked first in 1993, second in 2000, 
third in 2001, fourth in 2002 and fifth in 2003 (Goldstein, 2007 with data CEMEX 
produces several products of cement which have achieved the second and third largest 
producer depending on a specific product. After a prominent rise from local-base company 
in Monterrey to the second largest cement company in the world, CEMEX became one of 
the most prominent companies in a capital-intensive business, operating in more than 50 
countries.  
 
In mid-1970s, CEMEX started to export to the Southern United States, Central 
American and the Caribbean region. Because the antidumping regulations were rife, 
CEMEX oriented its strategy towards foreign direct investment. The internationalization 
strategy of CEMEX had as a major motivation the risk management. As a consequence of 
the 1982 crisis, the aggressive strategy of CEMEX was to consolidate its position in the 
national market through acquisitions of cement plants, finding innovative ways of paying 
using domestic capital markets.  
 
The strategy of CEMEX centered on processes of innovation is leading to become 
one of the stronger world/wide competitors in the cement industry. In 1992 Cemex invested 
on Valenciana and Sanson, two Spanish cement plants. During the Mexico’s 1995 
economic crisis CEMEX channeled offshore production into foreign markets as Florida and 
Puerto Rico and scooping up cement mixers in Colombia, Dominican Republic, Panama, 
Trinidad, Venezuela. During the Asian crisis in 1997 CEMEX took advantage and bought 
cement plants in Indonesia and Philippines.  
 
CEMEX reinforced its international operations through the strategy of 
diversification until becoming the second largest cement company in the world. However, 
the competitiveness of CEMEX is higher in the emerging markets. CEMEX became a 
multinational corporation by acquiring and absorbing companies all over the world: United 
States, Latin American countries, England, Spain, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, etc. 
CEMEX Acquired Southdown, Inc. in United States in 2000 and RMC in the United 
Kingdom in 2005 motivated by a strategy focused “…to balance out markets with high 
risks and high profit margins with less profitable but more stable markets operating in hard 
currency” (Tavares, 2007:54).  
 
After CEMEX took over Southdown, its main America competitor became the 
largest US cement producer Economist, 2004). With the acquisition of RMC by CEMEX, 
Europe became its largest market amounting around 40 percent of total sales. CEMEX has 
also offered a bid to the Australian building materials group Rinker.  
 
Between 1990 and 2006, CEMEX completed more than 40 operations of overseas 
acquisitions. Financial policies and expertise used by CEMEX had been accounted by 
Sarathy and Wesley (2003). At the same time, CEMEX entered to international markets 
through co-ownership and exports. This strategy was modified because of the antidumping 
lawsuit against the Mexican cement. Also CEMEX invest in Greenfield specifically in 
natural resources exploration and production. CEMEX challenges the incorporation of local 
and isolated operations into a global production and distribution system by taking 
advantage of the best practices (CEMEX, 2001) based on a system of just in time delivery.  
 
CEMEX has around half of its cash flow in Unites States and Europe and the 
remaining half in countries as diverse as Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines and of course, 
México (Expansión, 2004). CEMEX is considering a strategy to enter to China and Russia 
and Turkey’ markets, where its products would compete with low-quality local cement, and 
where the acquisition of cement assets owned by the state and individual investors may be 
smoother (Reforma, 2004b).  
 
The strategy of CEMEX is to concentrate investments in developing countries 
where the profits are higher because the small levels of purchase of bags for self-
construction and small-scale building. Also, the strategy of CEMEX relies heavily on a just 
in time delivery system of distributing concrete. CEMEX is implementing the franchise 
Construrama, a strategy of low prices for low quantities to cater and provide access to the 
lower economic segments by selling inexpensive bags of cement for the self-construction 
market. In association with GE Capital launched a Constructcard project. The design and 
development of a strategy based on a business model to create value for the emerging 
consumers, requires alignment of other parties involved such as suppliers, wholesalers and 
retailers.  
 
Other strategy attracts remittances from immigrants for their families and ensures 
that funds are properly and safely invested in building materials to build their dwellings. 
Through the strategy of corralones, CEMEX grants credit and give advisory assistance to 
small suppliers of building materials. Also as a strategy, CEMEX emphasize continuous 
innovation for sustainable economic development with a strong commitment to 
environment and corporate social responsibility supports environmental protection projects 
in cooperation with NGOs.  
 
CEMEX has developed its own information system and set up a satellite network to 
transmit data. CEMTEC is a subsidiary taking care of managerial development programs. 
CEMEX has merged with other companies to create Neories, and IT consultancy now 
together with Constructmix, a construction-industry marketplace and Latinexus, an e-
procurement, are part of CxNetwork an e-business company.  
 
Cydsa, a group of 18 companies specialized in textiles, chemicals and plastics which were 
very successful during the eighties due to its strategies of diversification and strategic 
alliances. The group went into financial difficulties during the 1994-95 Mexican crises, just 
to the point of selling two thirds of its assets to be able to pay debts. 
 
DESC is a supplier to auto companies on a competitiveness based on its high-quality auto 
parts and low-cost capabilities for production. 
 
Femsa owns the largest Coca-Cola bottling group in the world, a brewing company and a 
convenience-store chain. The alliance FEMSA – Coca Cola enables it to build the 
distribution channels and manage the network in the Latin American market. Femsa is 
expanding towards new markets of beer and beverages in Canada, United States and Latin 
American countries. 
 
Gruma (Grupo Maseca) is the largest producer of tortillas, dominates the market of 
several American countries and through the implementation of a strategy of international 
expansion, it exports to more than 50 countries around the world. The tortilla and corn flour 
market in the U.S. reports 60% of its total income and have plans to duplicate capacity. 
Gruma ranked 40th among the top 50 multinationals based on emerging economies 
measured by 2002 foreign assets, according to the estimations of Godstein (2007). Gruma 
is investing in creating new plants located in places where there is demand of the product, 
such as China, Russia, Australia, Africa, etc. Gruma is heavily investing in the markets of 
Asia and Oceania to concentrate in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. 
 Grupo Bimbo is the second only to Yamazaki (Japan) producer of baked food products in 
the world (Expansion, 2005). It is a packaged bread and baking company evolving to a 
diversified operation of more than 5, 000 products, including sliced bread, sweets, 
chocolates and salted snacks. Bimbo is among the largest in its respective market niche that 
relies heavily on acquisitions to growth abroad. Bimbo started business operations in 
United States in 1984 and in Guatemala in 1991, followed by other acquisitions in Chile 
and Colombia. Now, it has factories in most of Latin-American, Asian and European 
countries and has been very successful in the Hispanic market. Bimbo set up manufacturing 
plants in strategic alliance with McDonalds and has bought Park Lane Confectionary of 
Germany and invested in Eastern Europe. The successful strategy followed is to manage 
and have control over the whole logistics, physical distribution and supply chain.  
 
Grupo Bimbo operates in a multilevel environment having rivals at both domestic 
market and in global markets. Bimbo has benefitted from the competitive advantages 
offered by the agro-industry sector. The internal resources, competitive advantage, 
competition in the bread business, the institutional environment, elements of corporate 
governance, competitive conditions in foreign markets, etc., are some of the factors leading 
to the competitiveness of Bimbo in home and foreign markets.  
 
Bimbo takes advantage of its strengths in the distribution networks and hiring 
managers and entrepreneurs from the lower economic segments. These competitive 
conditions of Bimbo in the domestic market are quite different to the competitive 
conditions of rivals in their home country, which gives Bimbo and advantage over its 
competence in the Latin American markets. Bimbo ranked 47th among the top 50 
multinationals based on emerging economies measured by 2003 foreign assets, according to 
the estimations of Goldstein (2007). 
  
Grupo Carson is a sister company of Carson Telecom and the largest Mexican 
conglomerate that has businesses en different manufacturing and retailing sectors operating 
in several countries of America, Asia and Europe. In 1996, the telephone holdings were 
spun off into separate firms. It has main six subsidiaries and more than 200 small 
subsidiaries. Group Carson owns industrial, consumer and retail holdings. Commercial 
enterprises report to the Carso Holding Company. Also in finances and banking, it holds 
Grupo Financiero Inbursa including a commercial bank, an insurance company, and a 
stockbroker.  
 
Telmex, the Mexican telephone company, after privatization in 1990, it was acquired in a 
joint venture with Southwestern Bell and has become one of the biggest competitors in 
America. Modernization of Telmex occurred in 1995-96 after the new regulatory 
framework. Telmex controls more than 90% of all fixed phone lines in Mexico. In 2006 
Telmex bought 3.5 percent stake at Portugal Telecom. 
 
America Movil is a spinoff of the holding company Carso Global Telecom since 2000 and 
together with Telmex, they have multiply acquisitions. America Movil offers the operation 
of the cellular phone services and has control of more than 80% of the Mexican market 
(Financial Times, 2006). America Movil is the largest or second largest wireless 
communications business in most Latin-American countries and tenth of the world. From 
2001 to 2005, America Movil invested in Latin American markets to build a strong 
presence through the strategy of replication of its own business model. America Movil was 
transformed in only two years to become the largest telecommunications company in the 
Latin America in 2005. America Movil ranked sixth among the top 50 multinationals based 
on emerging economies measured by 2003 foreign assets, according to the estimations of 
Goldstein (2007). Multinational expansion of America Movil has been based on the 
strategies to keep low-costs and to market prepaid telephone cards.  
 
In 2005, America Movil in partnership with Bell Canada, Inc. and SBC 
International set up Telecom Americas. Some strategies that Telecom Americas implement 
are to develop economies of regional scale on technical and managerial services, to lower 
costs by pooling human resources, its ability to deal and negotiate with governments, and to 
diversify to get into new and more dynamic areas of telecommunications. Telecom 
Americas has subsidiaries and joint ventures in several Latin American countries, United 
States, Spain, etc.  
 
Carso has as a self declared strategy to keep costs down, to get close to customers, and to 
be leaders in every segment it enters. The competitive strengths of Grupo Carso include 
knowledge of the market and distribution for telephone service. Carso moves in and out of 
the business as competitive advantages and conditions change following a diversification 
portfolio’s strategy, although the degree of diversification remains unchanged in unrelated 
businesses.  
 
Grupo Modelo was the third was the third-largest brewery world-wide. It has developed an 
aggressive business model targeting high- price segments’ needs and achieving leading 
positions in more than 140 overseas markets of beers, such as the case of Corona Beer. 
Corona beer has a selective distribution in international markets where its brand is 
associated to the image of attractive and colorful vacations. 
 
Grupo Televisa is one of leading in the business of media production in the world, 
broadcasting and advertising, cable TV radio and disc production operating in Latin 
America, United States and Spain. The soap opera has been successful in Asian countries.  
Mabe was a domestic appliance industry until it formed a strategic alliance with a global 
firm and had access to better technological competences. Mabe fill orders of domestic 
appliances for General Electric since 1993 when there was a shortage in supply for the 
regional markets (Bonaglia, et al., 2006). In 2005, Mabe had 69 percent of international 
sales out of total sales.   
 
IMSA is a producer of steel and metal products has invested in the Latin American region 
and concentrating operations on IMSA Acero, relocation and enlargement of stations in 
order to innovate and diversify. IMSA has distribution and manufacturing operations in 
countries in America, Africa, Asia, Australia and Europe. 
 
Ingenieros Civiles Asociados (ICA) is engaged on the business of civil engineering 
services targeting large infrastructure building projects and industrial park complexes. It 
has been operating in most of Latin American countries and Unites States. 
  
Mexichem is a chemical company that has vertically integrated its vinyl–chlorine (PVC) 
and fluorite chain business, building the position as the world´s largest fluorite mine for 
PVC. 
 
Newak benefits of its increased integration of previously acquired firms. The international 
sales represented 82 percent of total sales in 2005, according to data from América 
Economía (2005) 
 
Vitro, a glass company, has concentrated in a divestment, building strategic alliances and 
acquisition strategies to concentrate core and competitive production in strategic business 
of flat glass and glass containers with emphasis on the food and automobile industrial 
sectors oriented toward increasing exports. Vitro has already sold some companies involved 
in household appliances, like Cydsa and Crisa, the development of fibers, such as Vifisa 
and plastics and chemicals like Vancan, Bosco and Qímica M. and had ended some 
strategic alliances in non-strategic sectors. The growing Hispanic market remains as a 
challenge to Vitro. Vitrocrisa is a joint venture between Vitro and Libbey is supplying 
Sunbeam already producing in China and Mexican beverage producers already exporting to 
China (Reforma, 2004a).  
 
Other Mexican emerging multinationals enterprises (MexEMNEs) doing operations 
overseas at small scale are: Condumex produces automobile cables. Grupo Industrial 
Saltillo (GIS) produces engines blocks and heads. San Luis is one of the World’s biggest 
producers of light-vehicle suspension springs. 
 
Other important Mexican retailers operating abroad are three chains of drugs and 
pharmaceutical products, Farmacias Similares, Farmacias Benavides y Farmacias Del 
Ahorro, all of them are already expanding to other Latin American countries. Grupo 
Elektra, a retailer in electronics and furniture, has more than 1,000 points of sail in Latin 
America, covers the whole chain from marketing to customer credit supported by other 
sisters: TV Azteca and Banco Azteca.   
 
 
8. Scenarios for Mexican emerging MNEs 
 
The economic globalization processes and operations of Mexican emerging MNEs have 
small impact and contribution to national economic growth and development because the 
low-level of intra –firm trade. 
 
The development and innovation of high technology companies require the strategic 
support from the State, research and high learning institutions, financial programs, and so 
forth, in order to absorb uncertainty and reduce risk and failures. 
 
Mexican emerging MNEs will continue strategically seeking enlargement of international 
market operations by boosting investments and positioning in other countries. The strategy 
of MNEs of grow abroad will move from organic growth to be more oriented toward the 
implementation of strategic business models based on mergers and acquisitions, 
partnerships and joint ventures. 
 
More South-South flows of outward investments, joint ventures, partnerships and strategic 
alliances will be on the rise among Mexican emerging MNEs and other firms of emerging 
economies to target overseas markets. The increasing South-South flow of investments, 
resources and technology is a major change underway in the economic globalization 
processes which is erasing the divide between the center and the periphery.  
 
Emerging Mexican MNEs will take advantage and benefit from understanding the role of 
local economic, legal and cultural dimensions on their practices in different national 
environments. Mexican MNEs are recognizing the strong influence that national cultures 
are exerted on the outcomes. Therefore, Mexican MNEs will be relying increasingly on 
leveraging worldwide talent. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
  
There is a trend showing and signaling the emergence of new economic phenomena under 
the economic process of globalization represented by the rise of Mexican emerging 
multinationals enterprises (MexMNEs). Among the forces driving this trend are the 
economic processes of globalization, macroeconomic structural reforms, the fast moving 
systems of transportation and low-cost information and communication technologies, lower 
costs of capital and more favorable global financial system.  
 
This new global economic environment is becoming more competitive and pressing 
business around the world to continue growing, sustain competitiveness and create value 
beyond their national borders, as new competitors appear in the markets. Mexican MNEs’ 
strategy of grow abroad at overseas markets is mainly through organic growth and in less 
proportion through mergers and acquisitions 
 
The overseas operations of Mexican emerging MNEs are entering into a new phase 
of international expansion in global markets, looking for direct presence related to the 
increasing sales. Mexican emerging MNEs are entering into a more globalized scale of 
activities through outward investments in new ventures, acquisition of assets, forming 
partnerships, strategic alliances and joint ventures. Emerging Mexican multinationals had 
invested overseas based on their ability to manage uncertain, complex and competitive 
environments as the result of severe economic crises, economic liberalization, structural 
reforms and steady economic globalization processes. This condition shows that Mexican 
firms present one of the highest rates of trade-openness among the emerging economies.  
 
Mexican emerging MNEs attempt to enter and expand to emerging and mature 
markets equipped with business models combining low-cost, high-quality products and 
services and efficient systems of logistics and distribution channels to reach the overseas 
target markets. 
 
All the Mexican emerging MNEs have very similar elements in common: They 
have the origins from very large domestic firms, low-cost resources including labor, a week 
institutional legal system and economic and financial environment leading to a critical and 
cyclical periods of crises (1982, 1987, 1994-95, 2008-2010) followed by negative or low 
economic growth. The survivor Mexican firms of this process of “creative destruction” 
have transformed into capable and innovative MNEs in order to look and move ahead and 
take advantage of the challenging new opportunities.  
 
Mexican Emerging MNEs are averse to implement the strategy of risk 
diversification to create a portfolio of outward investments allocation in assets and natural 
resources. Also risk diversification through a portfolio allocation prevents exchange rate 
and commodity prices fluctuations.    
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